NGOs and Development in the Arab World:
The Critical Importance of a Strong Partnership Between
Government and Civil Society[i]

By

 Denis J. Sullivan, Northeastern University

This article first appeared in Civil Society and Democratisation in the Arab World, the journal of the Ibn Khaldun Center, Cairo Egypt.  June 2000, vol. 9, no. 102.  Published on the Web with permission of Ibn Khaldun Center.

Whether they are struggling for adequate or quality health care and education; affordable housing, food, and

transportation; employment; or legal rights – Palestinians, Egyptians, Jordanians, and Lebanese (and other Arab

communities) face either

l                    the hurdles of poverty and inadequate resources, or

l                    a government that is unable to satisfy their needs. 

Generally, these communities suffer from both.  When they face such problems, and especially when their own

governments fail to help, people in any country in any part of the world often turn to non-governmental

organizations (NGOs) and other community-based organizations (mosques, churches, private clubs, and so on)

for help.  However, NGOs face their own significant problems and obstacles.  For example, NGOs in Palestine,

Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and many other countries are limited by:

l                    inadequate resources

l                    lack of governmental financial support

l                    duplication of functions

l                    weak organizational set-up

l                    lack of routine external audits

l                    absence of strict internal rules and regulations

l                    administrative inefficiency

All of these are significant problems.  One of the most fundamental obstacles to successful NGO operations,

however, is governmental policy and regulations on their “citizens.”  Governments (both Arab and non-Arab

alike) throughout the region are known for their restrictive nature, not allowing their people to enjoy such human

rights as freedom of assembly, speech, free enterprise, and association.  A number of governments are in the

process of modifying the restrictive nature of their regimes.  There are strong advocates of democracy in

Palestine, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and elsewhere.  There are positive changes in all four of these Arab countries,

along with other Arab states, that gives us hope for democracy, respect for human, civil, and political rights, and

therefore hope for economic progress and development for their peoples.  Yet, there remains a long way to go

before such objectives are achieved in these societies and polities.

The experiences in Egypt, Palestine, Jordan, and Lebanon demonstrate a persistent struggle between civil societies and potentially democratic political systems.   While all have varying degrees of democratic trappings (elections, three branches of government, political parties, nominally civilian rule, and so on), restrictions remain on people’s abilities to:

§         assemble and speak as they wish;

§         express themselves in writing, e.g., writers and journalists; and

§         form their own private, voluntary, non-profit organizations. 

Such restrictions do not actually help governments govern or lead their people.  These restrictions actually only hurt society overall as well as the government seeking to lead.  Despite such restrictions, in these and many other countries across the world, there is a continuing push from below (and even from within) government levels to enhance the role of associations (unions, parties, NGOs, and the media) and to move toward a democracy.

Just as governance at the state level must be improved, so too must civil society institutions.  NGOs themselves

must become even more responsible to their constituents, their communities, the clients they serve, and their

society overall.  They must govern themselves in democratic fashion just as they ask their governments to respect

democracy and human rights.  To govern themselves in a “more democratic” fashion, NGOs should:

§         develop their own code of conduct;

§         allow their members to participate in the decision-making process;

§         insist on open, fair, and regular (e.g., every 2-3 years) elections of officers/leaders; and

§         be more transparent and accountable – to their constituents and also to their neighbors, who may not use their services but who must live within the same community.

As in any democratic system (political and non-political), the majority should be tolerant of the views of the minority.  This does not just mean religious or ethnic majority vs. minority.  It also means majority opinion vs. minority opinion.  For example, in Egypt and Jordan there are many examples of syndicates expelling members for supporting the peace process or for visiting Israel.  In other cases, there are syndicates and NGOs that expel members simply because these members disagree with the majority view on domestic, religious, and/or international issues.

Learning Lessons, Sharing Experiences

Palestinians, Egyptians, Jordanians, and Lebanese can learn from each other as well as from others who have struggled against poverty, occupation, civil war, or government inability to win these battles on its own.  The lessons learned from South Africa, Bangladesh, Eastern Europe, The Philippines, and elsewhere is that only when the state (through the government) works with the society (through NGOs, syndicates/unions [niqabaat], and popular organizations) can development occur, can poverty be alleviated, and can progress be made. 

One critical beginning point of this partnership is the establishment of laws and regulations governing the work of NGOs in a society.  Legislation that regulates NGOs in Egypt and Palestine is still evolving.  Even though both countries recently have passed new NGO laws, the real test of these laws is how they are put into practice.   Both societies are at a critical juncture in the development of their respective partnerships between state and society.  But it is not only the government that regulates NGOs.  NGOs must regulate themselves.  One important way of doing this is to develop a national “code of conduct” for NGOs and by NGOs.  With such a code, NGO leaders will demonstrate to state leaders that they are professionals and they seek recognition from the state as partners in advancing the causes that both the government and the NGOs care about: education, health care, employment opportunities, environmental protection, and so on.  A code of conduct provides the government as well as members of NGOs to hold NGO leaders accountable and keep their governing process “transparent” (or observable) to both civil society and the state.

In order to determine how Arab governments and civil societies can better work together as partners in promoting economic and social development, it is helpful to remember what Egypt and other states have gone through in the last few years.   These lessons will be especially helpful to Palestine as it moves toward statehood and as it further develops its own governing practices (hopefully these will be “democratic” practices but the past few years indicate they are more traditionally authoritarian, as in surrounding Arab states). 

Egypt:  Voluntarism and the Evolution of the NGO Sector

As is true in Palestine, NGOs in Egypt have a rich history. So, too, does voluntarism, tatawwa^ciyya.  In the 19^th Century, NGOs in Egypt were mainly religious in nature, both Islamic and Christian.  These NGOs had a rapid growth after World War II and in the late 1950s, and began to be transformed in the Nasser era as government sought an increasing role in the daily private lives of its subjects.  Yet with the failure of Egypt’s government to displace private initiative, there has been a gradual reassertion of voluntarism and “self-help” in Egypt.  Such voluntarism is aimed at needy and impoverished communities.  This voluntaristic impulse has developed over the past century from a predominantly elitist sense of noblesse oblige to a more middle-class willingness to help communities in need.  Also, there is the overwhelming impulse for survival by impoverished and neglected subjects of the authoritarian state.

            These community organizations are a primary component of Egyptian civil society.  Until recently, and under the old Law 32, there were approximately 14,000 NGOs registered with the government of Egypt.  Roughly 11,000 of these NGOs have been actively working throughout the country to provide health care, education, job training, child care, elder care, welfare, legal assistance, human rights monitoring^[ii], access to credit (especially for women), water, irrigation, environmental, and other social and economic services to a largely poor population.   Community development associations, Islamic and Christian charitable groups, feminist organizations, student groups, and (more recently) capitalist associations are active in satisfying their own markets, their own community needs.

            Use of the terms "Private Voluntary Organizations” (PVOs) and "Non-Governmental Organizations" (NGOs) to describe charitable, development, non-profit, and other organizations is done with some skepticism in Egypt.  Virtually all participants in and observers of NGO activity in Egypt recognize that these organizations are far from being independent of the government and many in fact are creations of that government.^[iii] 

            This is hardly unique to Egypt.  NGOs are established in many developing countries by governments

 themselves or by officials of those governments.  (In these cases, we refer to such groups as “GONGOs” –

Government Organized [or Oriented] NGOs.)  Still, the relationship between NGOs and the state can be hostile

as much as it can be cooperative.  There are numerous examples from Egypt about this distrustful and hostile

nature of state-NGO relations.  The three targets of Egyptian government hostility include women’s groups,

Islamist groups, and human rights groups.  Three of the most prominent examples are AWSA, the Arab

Women's Solidarity Association, which was disbanded by the government in 1991; the Muslim Brotherhood,

which the government refuses to register either as a political party or an NGO; and the Egyptian Organization for

Human Rights.

Economic Reality forces a Change, favoring NGOs

In 1990, Egypt’s economy was in serious decline. President Mubarak faced the need to restructure the economy, to loosen up his government’s tight grip on that economy by encouraging the private sector, and to attack poverty, unemployment, inflation, and dangerously high international debt.  One way of doing this was to establish, with World Bank management, a Social Fund for Development in Egypt.  This Social Fund has now attracted over $1 billion in assistance to retrain workers, improve public transportation, and attack poverty.  One major partner in this Fund is Egypt’s NGO sector.

The enormous expectations placed on Egyptian NGOs by the government and especially by the World Bank to

offset the negative effects of structural adjustment and privatization in some ways parallels the expectations

placed on Palestinian NGOs to develop a debilitated economy.  In both cases, it is evident that NGOs are

indeed critical partners with states, especially if states are unable to fulfill their development and social welfare

functions.  While governments worldwide abdicate these roles (or otherwise fail to fulfill them), many fail to

relinquish their tight controls over society or to otherwise provide a supportive policy environment necessary to

allow societal organizations to more freely assemble, speak, or engage in development activities.  Egypt

unfortunately reflects this old way of thinking and yet there is great potential that Egypt will now move toward a

partnership with NGOs rather than continue to fight NGOs as if they were adversaries to the government.  The

potential is found in the activism that continues in this country, not in the NGO legislation that was recently passed (May 1999).

The struggle to amend Egypt’s Law of Associations

The campaign to amend Egypt’s Law of Associations (or “NGO Law”) has been going on for several years.  The struggle had been to amend or otherwise overturn the infamous Law 32 of 1964, a law instituted by President Nasser to control popular organizations (NGOs, private foundations, and other associations outside of the state’s sphere).  NGO leaders and international development specialists had argued since the early 1990s that Law 32 was destructive to NGOs, civil society, and especially economic development.  These leaders wanted to throw out or otherwise amend Law 32.  For years, human rights, women’s, Islamist, and other organizations had to work around Law 32 because the government either denied them permission to register (e.g., Egyptian Organization for Human Rights and the Muslim Brotherhood) or disbanded them using Law 32 as justification (e.g., Arab Women’s Solidarity Association).  In some cases, these groups registered as non-profit companies under the civil code.  This greatly restricted their abilities to function as development or legal rights NGOs.  Thus, the effort to reform Law 32 continued.

In 1997, however, several human rights activists and other NGO leaders decided it was better not to discuss amending Law 32 for fear that if the government made changes, it could worsen their situation[iv].  How insightful these activists were, for that is exactly what has occurred.

On May 27, 1999, Egypt's Parliament (Majles al-Sha’b) unanimously passed Law 153, which strengthens the government’s control over NGOs.  This legislative act, pushed by President Mubarak, is all the more insulting and destructive to those Egyptians who work for development, human rights, and civil liberties because the government had turned to civil society organizations to help draft the law.  The law that passed in May, however, has “nothing to do”[v] with the draft that emerged from a “consultative process,” involving NGO leaders working with government officials.  In other words, somewhere between the consultative process that did include a few NGO representatives and the Parliament’s actions, a significant switch occurred.  The new language that was not seen by those NGO stakeholders and supposed partners is as bad as the original Law 32 that all saw as outdated and in need of progressive reform.

The new law lays down operating rules for private groups working on everything from health care and education to civil rights. It gives the government powers to disband boards of directors, nullify their decisions and object to the groups' foreign funding.

The law also bars private groups from participating in political activity, a restriction in keeping with Law 32 and one with which most NGO leaders agree. The main targets of these restrictions are the human rights, Islamist, and pro-democracy groups that have repeatedly angered and embarrassed the Egyptian government through their effective efforts at promoting development, public awareness, and human rights.

But if the Government of Egypt was trying to reach out to the NGO sector as “partners in development,” they have done nearly the opposite – the way in which the government “reached out” to NGOs was more of a closed fist than an open hand.  The process of establishing a new legislative environment has led many NGO leaders to view their relationship with the government as “turbulent and confrontational,”[vi] not as cooperative and mutually respectful.  The possibility that things will improve is not great.

Jordan’s Control of NGOs: Participants, not Partners

If the Government of Egypt’s approach toward its NGO sector is to fight it, restrict it, control it, and frequently to crush it, the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan’s approach differs mainly in style.  Like Egypt, Jordan’s government seeks to control NGOs but also has a paternalistic, protective approach.  In other words, Jordan encourages NGO activity as long as it can guide that activity.  Hence, Jordan recognizes the value of NGOs as participants in development but not necessarily as partners in development. Despite lobbying by the NGO community asking King Abdullah II to change NGO legislation and regulation, there does not appear to be much difference between the new King and his father, King Hussein, in the approach toward NGOs.[vii]  Thus, Jordan has not taken the next step in liberating the NGO sector, allowing it to develop on its own terms or to determine for itself the needs of the Jordanian people.

In Jordan, as in Egypt, there is no full partnership between government and NGOs.  Indeed, NGOs and other civil society organizations are sub-divided and regulated by the government according to their mission.  “The Ministry of Interior regulates political parties, unions, and professional associations; the Ministry of Culture regulates all cultural [NGOs]; and the Ministry of Social Development regulates all charitable organizations.  Each government Ministry controls all activities within its respective area of responsibility, and organizations are not permitted to engage in activities which cross into the purview of multiple Ministries.  Civil society is thus partitioned and segmented into administrative units based upon the logic of bureaucratic control.”[viii] In addition to being administratively “efficient,” such partitioning also serves the political logic that was typical of British and French colonialism: “divide and conquer.”

Lebanon

            In Lebanon, NGOs that would otherwise be focused on social and economic development often find

themselves drawn into political activism.  This should not be the case for NGOs unless they are specifically

organized around political, human, or civic rights issues.  But given that Lebanon is occupied by Israel and

dominated politically and militarily by Syria, even the social and economic NGOs find themselves drawn into

political campaigns against their will.  For example, when the government of Lebanon decided in 1997 to

postpone local elections (34 years after the last local elections were held), activists from 15 NGOs organized a

media and public awareness campaign that eventually led the government to reverse its decision.  This campaign

of civil society actors to work together and to move public policy forward is a success story, however it is far too

rare in Lebanon.  NGOs in Lebanon for the most part are unable to coordinate their activities because of:

§                     lingering distrust due to civil war,

§                     an inability to travel safely into areas occupied by Israel (and Syria),

§                     a lack of a tradition of cooperation that cuts across religious, geographic, and ideological lines.

Only when Lebanon is free of Israeli occupation and Syrian control and when its government is accountable to its own people can the NGO sector move toward greater integration and cooperation within itself.  And only when NGOs get their own internal “house in order” can the sector work as a full partner with the Lebanese state.  Until that time, NGOs will remain divided, even if individually effective at fighting for displaced persons, the environment, and social services.

Palestine

            Palestinian NGOs developed in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem for two main reasons.  First, NGOs in Palestine – as throughout many Arab societies – have played an historic role in advancing the social, cultural, and economic needs of hundreds of local communities as well as the national unit[ix].  Second, in the absence of a state and a government with institutions established to provide direct assistance to its people, Palestinian NGOs (PNGOs) in effect took on the additional task of filling in for the non-existent or absent state.  When the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) was established in 1994, many NGO leaders merged their institutions and activities into the PNA structure.[x]  But most did not.  While willing to transfer some responsibilities to their government, most NGO leaders prefer to stay in the “third sector” (the non-profit arena).  Much of the health and education services run by the PNA are inherited from the Israeli Civil Administration.  Still, Israel did not provide adequate investment during occupation to maintain staff and facilities. The result: the PNA inherited largely ineffective service delivery operations. 

            The NGOs, on the other hand, picked up the slack of Israel’s neglect throughout the 1970s and 1980s.  Now, most NGO leaders remain convinced of the continuing need to provide their services (efficient, effective, time-tested) to the poor and marginalized people of Palestine.  As for the future, even when the PNA or its successor (i.e., a Government of Palestine) becomes a more effective institution, NGOs will remain vital.  No government can (or should attempt to) provide all services needed to sustain even the wealthiest of nations.

            In the Palestinian context, NGOs play “an essential part in delivering economic and social services in the West Bank and Gaza [Strip] and in developing democratic institutions in Palestinian society. . . . In early 1996, it was estimated that NGOs provided about 60% by value of all primary health care services and up to one-half of secondary and tertiary health-care.  All disability and preschool programs are run by NGOs as well as most agricultural services, low-cost housing programs and micro-enterprise credit schemes.”[xi]  PNGOs also provide a great deal of primary education, especially in Jerusalem where the vast majority of Palestinian children attend religious or secular private schools, run mostly by Palestinian or international NGOs.

            PNGOs must play such an active and diverse role in social, economic, and political life in Palestine due to the desperate socio-economic conditions befalling Palestinians. In a word, poverty.  Poverty in Palestine continues despite (or many argue because of) the Oslo peace process.

            With the establishment of the PNA, there was further expectation that poverty could be reduced and development could be advanced.  Rather than a partner with PNGOs, however, the PNA came to be seen by some as an alternative to (or replacement of) PNGOs.  By late 1995, the World Bank could demonstrate that Palestinian NGOs were losing millions of dollars annually from international donors: governments (Arab states in particular), multilateral development agencies, INGOs, and private foundations.  Some of this was due to the effects of the Gulf War as previously supportive Gulf Arab states cut-off or reduced considerably their funding to Palestinian NGOs.  Much more support for PNGOs was lost once the PNA was established in 1994.  “By the early 1990s Palestinian NGOs were receiving somewhere between $140-$220 million each year from outside sources.  By 1994, the first full year of the Oslo process, external support contracted to about $90 million, and in 1995 and 1996 stabilized at about $60 million per annum – a loss in external revenue of somewhere between a half and three quarters during a six-year period.”[xii]

            PNGOs lost revenues primarily because bilateral and multilateral donors were committed to supporting the newly established Palestinian National Authority.  International donor representatives have expressed concern that, in working with the PNA, there remains a great deal to learn about grass-roots organization and development.  Thus, these donors express a preference for the NGOs, both out of desire to protect the sector overall and to work with groups that have a proven track record in development.

            The struggle, however, is to retain the NGOs while supporting and promoting the efficiency and effectiveness of the PNA.  A World Bank official, analyzing U.S. aid policy aimed at supporting the new PNA, asserts that the U.S. “made the tough, but I think the right, decision to move money out of NGOs in order to support the PA, which was on the verge of collapsing.  So, we saved the governing structure, but we've hurt – in the short term – the NGOs.”[xiii]  This official recognized, early on in the peace process, the need to refocus donor efforts in order to maintain support for the Palestinian NGOs.

            Many argue that the PNA should be receiving funds instead of PNGOs since it is the PNA that serves as a caretaker for the future government of Palestine.  Yet, in the first few years of its existence, the Authority demonstrated it was incapable of providing the services and technical assistance that PNGOs had been providing for years throughout the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem. PNA officials were among the first to admit their inability to take on so much responsibility in providing services, especially health, education, and rehabilitation.  PNGO leaders also felt frustrated as a political entity emerged and asserted the authority over services and projects it could do little to promote.

            While some PNGO leaders complain when the PNA seeks out their advice, others have offered to “give up” their services and allow their new government to assume these functions.  PNA officials, however, generally have declined such offers, telling the NGO leaders that they (PNA) intend to wait for at least three years before they attempt to take over the massive number of services the NGOs provide.  Some in the PNA say they will attempt to learn from the NGOs first before attempting to do what the NGOs have been doing successfully for years.  The point is that NGOs will continue to uphold a majority of relief and developmental work for the foreseeable future and thus are in further need of donors' support.  Virtually everyone interviewed for this paper – donors, PNA officials, and NGO representatives – agrees that NGOs must be sustained and enhanced in order to promote relief and development and to develop civil society and democratization.  However, there remains a vocal and strong minority within the PNA that declares PNGOs as the enemy of the PNA, as either Islamist or communist opponents of Arafat and the structure of the PNA.  There is a long way to go to establish mutual trust and cooperation in Palestine.

Although PA-PNGO relations have been characterized as dysfunctional, especially between 1995-99, recent

developments offer some reason for optimism.  PNGO leaders have endorsed the new NGO Law.  Indeed,

many NGO leaders actually worked with Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) members to craft the legislation. 

The PLC/PNGO version of the law would have placed NGO regulation in the hands of the Ministry of Justice. 

President Arafat and his aides have said for a few years that they want to place NGOs under the jurisdiction of

the Ministry of Interior (which also deals with internal security) and/or the infamous “Monitoring Committee,” a

unit accountable only to the President.[xiv]   After Arafat’s amendment putting the Ministry of Interior in charge

of registering NGOs, neither the PLC nor the PNGO leadership sought to prolong the struggle and the law was

ratified in January 2000.

            Beyond the presidential hijacking of the law regulating PNA-NGO relations, the executive branch of the PNA has asserted itself in an aggressive way – to the detriment of the NGO community.  This is demonstrated through the actions of the mukhabaraat (secret police), which have continued to assert control over NGOs, especially in Gaza.[xv]  In addition, PNGOs remain caught between internal PNA power plays, such as struggles between MOPIC, PECDAR, and Social Welfare and especially between the Ministry of Interior and most others.

Another PNA ministry has been added to the already complex bureaucracy through which NGOs must navigate:

a Ministry for NGO Affairs.  This ministry was formed less than a year ago and whether it will facilitate NGO

activities (as NGOs hope and many assume might occur) or hinder them further has yet to be demonstrated.

Leadership of Civil Society in the Arab World

Of these four Arab polities and societies – Egypt, Palestine, Jordan, and Lebanon – which one will break from

the traditional path of autocratic rule, state monopoly of power, and distrust of popular organizations?  We would

expect Egypt to be such a leader, as it has for millennia.  However, given the current and past emphasis on state

control and governmental distrust of the Egyptian people, Egypt will more likely become a follower than a leader

in this cause.  Jordan’s new King is making the correct and bold statements indicating he will lead this new

movement toward popular partnership with government, however Abdullah II must first secure his own legitimacy

and mandate before he can fully implement this necessary change.  On the other hand, such a change is likely to

be the very thing he needs to secure that legitimacy, popularity, and mandate.  Lebanon is years away from

securing meaningful sovereignty over its own decision-making, as Syria will remain the ultimate controller of

Lebanese politics if not society.

Palestine is poised as the most likely leader for meaningful change, popular participation in governance and

partnership with government in order to promote both socio-economic development and political

democratization.  Palestine is indeed able to learn from its Arab neighbors even as it pursues its own path.  With

the rich history of Palestinian NGO activism, activity, experience, strength, and wisdom coupled with the urgent

need for NGO responsibility to govern itself, to regulate and moderate its own behavior, NGOs have positioned

themselves as full partners in development.  With the leadership of the PLO and the willingness of the PNA to

learn from their sisters and brothers in the NGO sector throughout the country, the Government of Palestine will

also be ready to serve as full partner in development – provided the new NGO legislation and especially the

practice of implementing that legislation is geared toward cooperation and not confrontation.

As Palestine becomes officially established and formally recognized by the international community as a

nation-state and full member of the global community, it has the opportunity to remake Arab history in favor of

greater rights and responsibilities for members of civil society.  Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon are similarly

positioned to follow Palestine’s lead, if Palestinian leaders set out on such a path.  If they do not, then the mantle

of leadership remains available for the taking.  The world awaits true leadership from the Arab world to empower

its people for the cause of social development, economic progress, and political democratization.  And much

more important than “the world” are the millions of Arab citizens who require such leadership immediately.

Denis J. Sullivan (Ph.D., University of Michigan, 1987) is Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of International Affairs at Northeastern University in Boston, Massachusetts.  His books include Islam in Contemporary Egypt: Civil Society vs. the State (co-author with Sana Abed-Kotob) (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999); Non-Governmental Organizations and Freedom of Association in Egypt and Palestine: A Comparative Analysis (Jerusalem: Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs, 1995); and Private Voluntary Organizations in Egypt: Islamic Development, Private Initiative, and State Control (University Press of Florida, 1994).  Professor Sullivan was Visiting Researcher at Bir Zeit University, Ramallah, Palestine (1995-96) and at Cairo University (1990-91) and has taught at the American University in Cairo (1990-91).

Endnotes